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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce signed on 
September 15, 1993, by the Honorable Robert L. Newey, Judge of the 
Second District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, and entered 
of record on September 17, 1993. Plaintiff's motion to set aside 
the stipulation upon which the Decree was based was pending on 
September 17, 1993, having been filed on July 30, 1993. Said 
motion was the subject of a hearing over two days in December, 
1993. The court entered its final order denying Plaintiffs Motion 
to Set Aside Stipulation and Decree of Divorce on February 4, 1994. 
There have been no prior appeals. 
Jurisdiction is based on Title 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code, and on 
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
approving, and subsequently refusing to set aside a stipulation 
entered into by Wife while suffering from extreme anxiety and while 
her reasoning was impaired by medication? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing 
to enter specific findings of fact justifying alimony, child 
support and property awards? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
approving, and subsequently refusing to set aside inequitable 
awards of alimony, child support and property? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An award of alimony by the trial court will not be disturbed 
so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the 
standards set by this state's appellate courts. Rudman v. Rudman, 
812 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 423 
(Utah App* 1990). The trial court's valuation and distribution of 
marital property similarly will not be disturbed absent a showing 
of a clear abuse of discretion. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 121 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
2 
While the trial court enjoys broad discretion in matters of 
divorce, such authority does not extend to an arbitrary and 
unreasonable power to disregard credible, uncontradicted evidence 
and make findings inconsistent therewith and issue an order based 
thereon. King v. King, 478 P.2d 492, 25 Utah 2d 163, 168 (1970). 
The proceedings are in equity and the appellate court may review 
questions of both law and fact, the very purpose of which is to 
rectify errors where the evidence does not support the findings or 
where it clearly preponderates against them, id.; Utah Const., Art. 
VIII, Sec. 9. Due to the advantaged position of the trial court in 
close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, in the practical 
application of this rule there is a presumption of correctness of 
the trial court's findings and judgment with the burden upon the 
appellant to show they are in error and the appellate court must be 
convinced that a manifest injustice has been done. State in 
Interest of K.K.H., Utah, 610 P.2d 849 (1980). 
The trial court is also afforded broad discretion in ruling on 
a motion for relief from judgment and its determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 
1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Title 30-3-5 Utah Code, as amended. See Exhibit A of 
addendum. 
Title 78-45-3 Utah Code, as amended. See Exhibit B of 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal of the trial court's approval of a 
stipulation in a divorce case, and subsequent refusal to set aside 
such stipulation, upon which the final Decree of Divorce was based. 
The stipulation established alimony and child support and awarded 
marital property between the parties. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiff/Appellant (Wife) filed for divorce. The case was 
scheduled for trial on April 28, 1993, and on that date the parties 
appeared for trial, However, after conferring outside the presence 
of the court, the parties presented an oral stipulation to the 
court which was approved and apparently obviated the need for 
trial. 
Thereafter, confusion over terms of the stipulation resulted 
in delay in submitting the final written Findings of Fact and 
Decree of Divorce to the court. In the meantime on July 30, 1993, 
Plaintiff moved to set aside the stipulation and to be allowed to 
proceed to trial on the grounds that the stipulation was 
unconscionable and that she had been under the influence of 
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medication on April 28 when the stipulation was approved. The 
court entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce on September 17, 1993, while Wife's motion to set aside 
the stipulation was pending. On December 20 and 28, 1993, the 
court held an evidentiary hearing on Wife's motion to set aside the 
stipulation and on February 4, 1994, the court entered its order 
denying Wife's motion. Wife then filed this appeal. 
3. Disposition in the District Court. 
The court declined to set aside the stipulation and Decree of 
Divorce, finding that Wife was able to understand the terms of the 
stipulation and that the terms of the stipulation were not 
unconscionable. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
Wife and Husband were married in December, 1975. Husband left 
Wife in 1991 after Husband had engaged in multiple heterosexual and 
homosexual affairs and Wife filed for divorce from Husband. (R. 
132) The breakup of the family plus fear of contracting AIDS and 
other sexually transmissible diseases caused Wife to suffer severe 
anxiety and depression. 
Wife's Anxiety 
Wife went to Dr. Samuel Wilson on September 3, 1991, 
complaining of what she thought was a strep throat. Dr. Wilson 
found that she had a sore throat with white patches in her mouth 
and heartburn. The mouth and throat condition was severely 
aggravated such that Doctor Wilson at first suspected that the 
5 
condition was probably cancer, although the condition ultimately 
proved to be ulcers related to stress. He suspected that the 
heartburn was caused by peptic ulcer disease or gastroesophageal 
reflex. Dr. Wilson prescribed Axid and Carafate for her stomach. 
(R. 477) He found Wife to be suffering from severe anxiety and on 
September 27, 1991, he prescribed .5 milligrams of Xanax every 
eight hours as needed to help her to function, sleep and minimize 
her gastrointestinal problems. (R. 478, 479, 487, 567) 
On November 12, 1991, Dr. Wilson also prescribed 20 milligrams 
of Prozac daily to treat Wife's severe depression. (R. 478, 479, 
487) The prescription was increased to 40 milligrams per day on 
February 19, 1992. At this time Dr. Wilson also authorized Wife to 
take up to eight .5 milligram doses of Xanax per day at times of 
increased anxiety. (R. 478, 479) 
Kurt B. Thorn, a licensed clinical psychologist, first saw 
Wife on August 27, 1991, and met regularly with Wife thereafter.1 
(R. 509, 510) He referred Wife to Dr. Wilson for prescription of 
medication after finding Wife to be depressed and very anxious. 
(R. 511, 512) He sought through treatment to help Wife to become 
more assertive in dealing with problems. Regarding Wife's 
condition Dr. Thorn testified: 
1Dr. Thome also counseled Husband while the parties assessed 
the future of their marriage. Dr. Thorne suspected that Husband 
may have dissociative process. However, Husband dropped out of 
therapy. (R. 516) 
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Q What were the things that you observed that 
lead you to believe that she was having trouble in 
assertiveness? 
A Diane in her anxiety becomes pretty confused at 
times and really indecisive and that's the symptom of the 
depression that she was experiencing. And through that 
indecisiveness she just was having a difficult time 
making correct decisions. She seemed to - - She 
perceived David as being way out of character from the 
person that she had been married to. And that was 
alarming to her. She was mostly confused and anxious 
about what to do in the circumstances she was under. 
(R. 515) 
Wife continued to take Xanax and Prozac through the date of 
trial. Wife's anxiety increased as the trial date approached. Her 
condition was aggravated by Husband's harassment which included 
constant telephone calls at her place of work wherein he used 
threats and vulgarities and entering the home without permission. 
(R. 570, 514, 516) Doctor Thorn testified that Wife's anxiety 
increased as Husband concluded that he wanted a divorce, as 
Husband's behavior deteriorated and as the trial date of April 28, 
1993, approached. (R. 513) 
Husband harassed Wife throughout the litigation and 
particularly during the two week period prior to trial. (R. 39, 
514, 570, 571) On April 27, 1993, the day before trial, Wife, 
Husband and counsel met for approximately six hours attempting to 
settle the case. The meeting was extremely stressful to Wife as 
Husband acted out by throwing books on the table and threatening to 
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leave the state or go to jail rather than work and provide support 
to his family. (R. 571) 
Consumption of Xanax 
Before the extremely high stress period preceding trial, Wife 
had been taking about one Xanax per day. She had not been taking 
the medicine during the day because it made her sleepy. (R. 598) 
Two weeks before the trial, Wife began taking two 5 milligram doses 
of Xanax each day and gradually increased the amount to three doses 
per day. (R. 597) On April 26, 1993, Wife took five 5 milligram 
doses of Xanax. Wife took three 5 milligram doses of Xanax before 
going to the settlement meeting on April 27, 1993. Before going to 
bed the night of April 27 Wife took four 5 milligram doses of 
Xanax. Unable to sleep she took another 5 milligram dose at 1:30 
a.m. (R. 598-604) The following morning before trial she took 
three 5 milligram doses of Xanax along with her regular dosage of 
Prozac.2 (R. 573, 604) 
Joyce Beckstrom, Wife's friend, testified that she had known 
Wife since 1983, and that on the morning of the settlement meeting 
on April 27, 1993, Wife had been very upset and had told Beckstrom 
that she had taken Xanax. (R. 656, 657) That evening following 
the conference Beckstrom saw Wife take Xanax between 6:00 and 8:00 
p.m. (R. 651, 661) Beckstrom testified that Wife was very upset 
following the meeting and that Beckstrom gave another Xanax to Wife 
2Husband attacked Wife's testimony by introducing prescription 
refill records to show that Wife would have already consumed all of 
her Xanax before April 28, 1993. (R. 596-7) 
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following the meeting and that Beckstrom gave another Xanax to Wife 
when Wife went to bed. Beckstrom stated, "I took the bottle to her 
and handed her the bottle because she was so upset and she was very 
upset and said she needed another one." (R. 660) 
Wife testified that before the high stress period prior to 
trial she did not regularly take the maximum amount of Xanax 
allowed each day and that she "stockpiled" unused Xanax as she re-
filled prescriptions. (R. 597) 
Effects of Xanax 
Regarding the side effects of Xanax Dr. Wilson testified: 
A Again, the side effects of Xanax are many. 
I guess the more severe is people that take Xanax will go 
out completely, be asleep, not be able to function at 
all. People have impaired thinking. May have increased 
difficulty with making judgments, rational decisions. 
May not be able to perform fine motor skills. May not be 
able to do as well on tests and memory type functions. 
But then again, if they have severe anxiety they may 
perform better. (R. 481) 
Q . . . Is there an eyeball figure about how 
much of a dosage it would take to make a person that 
confused (to the point of not being able to remember 
their street address)? 
A No. Some people do that on the lowest 
recommended dose and other people will have that impact 
even with what we consider toxic doses. So its 
individual. It's variable. (R. 482) 
Dr. Wilson testified that if a substantial increase in the 
dosage of Xanax occurs over a 24 or 48 hour period, individuals 
"don't think well at all." (R. 488) 
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Stipulation 
On April 28, 1993, the parties delayed the start of trial to 
continue settlement discussions. After approximately three and a 
half hours and being encouraged by the court to hurry, the parties 
advised the court that they had reached a stipulation. (R. 382, 
582) After the attorneys stated the terms of the stipulation to 
the court, the following exchange occurred: 
MR. LAWRENCE: I think that covers all the 
issues, Your Honor, unless there's something you'd like 
to address: 
THE COURT: No, I think not. Let me 
ask the Plaintiff, Diane Dautel, is this your 
understanding? Do you understand the stipulation that 
has been recited to the Court? 
MRS. DAUTEL: I think so. 
THE COURT: And is this your agreement? 
Is this what you want the — your divorce decree to 
incorporate by way of property settlement, alimony and 
support? 
MRS. DAUTEL: I guess. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MRS. DAUTEL: I'm a little iffy on it. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MRS. DAUTEL: I'm questioning it a little 
bit, but I guess I'll go along with it. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Could I talk with her one 
second your honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Of f-the-record discussion between Mr. Lawrence 
and Mrs. Dautel.) 
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MR. LAWRENCE: I think she's ready 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: We would — we would 
need you to state if that is your agreement, 
if that's what you're agreeing to at this 
time; otherwise, why the Court would proceed 
with the trial of the case. 
MRS. DAUTEL: Yes, I'll agree with that. 
THE COURT: And that's — that's 
what you want to do at this time? 
MRS. DAUTEL: Yes. 
. . . (R. 124-126) 
At this point, counsel for Husband interjected several 
additional items regarding the parties' stipulation, including a 
waiver of Husband's claim of a premarital contribution to the home 
and Wife's waiver of accrued and unpaid temporary alimony. (R. 126-
129) Then the following occurred: 
THE COURT: Very well. Now, with these 
clarifications, let me again ask each party if this is 
your agreement and if this is the agreement you want the 
divorce decree entered on and incorporated into the 
decree. 
You both understand what counsel has said by way of 
clarification, and this is your agreement. Is that 
correct, Mrs. Dautel? 
MRS. DAUTEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dautel? 
MR. DAUTEL: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court 
believes that through great effort on the part of counsel 
and the parties - - that's the reason I permitted you 
extra time rather than starting this morning — that you 
have been able to devise an agreement that appears to the 
Court to be fair and reasonable under all the 
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circumstances. And I would approve your agreement and 
permit you to incorporate it into the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree of divorce which the Court 
would sign. 
. . . (R. 129, 130) 
The court at no time asked Wife if she were taking any 
medication. Disputes concerning terms of the oral stipulation 
arose when the Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce were prepared 
and these documents were not signed by the court until nearly five 
months after the date of the stipulation. (R. 136) In the meantime, 
Wife concluded that her attorney had not protected her rights, 
obtained new counsel and filed a Motion to Set Aside Stipulation. 
(R. 137, 142) 
Terms of Stipulation 
At the time of trial, the parties had been married over 17 
years and had four children, custody of which was awarded to Wife. 
(R. 216, 217) Wife had worked only part-time within the home and 
made a few hundred dollars per month doing manicures. Defendant 
earned at least $4,129 per month. (R. 218) 
The stipulation provided that Husband would pay $944.00 per 
month as child support after imputing a wage of $800 to Wife, 
despite Wife's lesser actual earnings of under $600 per month made 
as a part-time manicurist at home (R. 51, 218, 580). Husband had 
been ordered to pay temporary child support of $990 per month in 
the temporary order, with no imputation of additional income to 
Wife being made. (R. 51) 
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Despite the long duration of the marriage and the great 
disparity in earnings, the stipulation provided that the Wife would 
receive only $100 per month as alimony for six months until certain 
stock would be sold and that she would thereafter receive permanent 
alimony in the amount of $300 per month. (R. 219, 220) Previously, 
Husband had been ordered to pay $400 as temporary alimony (R. 52) . 
The stipulation provided that Wife would receive the home 
subject to Husband's lien for one-half of the appraised equity 
which would be payable to Husband upon Wife's remarriage or 
cohabitation with another man. Wife was to assume responsibility 
for first and second mortgages on the home and to pay taxes 
thereon. (R. 220) Husband had depleted the savings account in 
which the parties' tax reserve was maintained leaving Wife to pay 
all taxes on the home for the year 1992. (R. 580, 581) 
The present division of personal property between the parties 
was confirmed. (R. 220) Wife was required to pay to Husband 
$7,000.00 adjusted for taxes upon receipt of one-half of certain 
shares of stock. (R. 221) Wife also waived $2,745 in delinquent 
temporary alimony. (R. 219, 579) Wife waived any claim to 
Husband7s 401K plan. (R. 222) Wife was required to pay her own 
attorney's fees, where Husband had been ordered to assist in the 
payment of attorney/s fees in the temporary order. (R. 223, 53) 
Hearing to Set Aside Stipulation 
At the hearing to set aside the stipulation, Wife testified 
that she did not understand, in light of temporary alimony having 
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been set at $400 per month, why alimony was reduced to $100 per 
month to be increased to $300 per month after the stock had been 
sold. She stated that there was no reason for alimony to be $100 
per month until the stock was sold as Husband's portion of debts 
had already been substantially paid off by April 28, 1993. (R. 
455, 460, 462, 463) 
Wife testified that she did not understand why she had to 
surrender the $2,745 in back alimony and pay $7,000 to her husband 
from her portion of the stock where the division of personal 
property and allocation of indebtedness did not leave her $7,000 
ahead, but $5,000 behind.3 (R. 575, 443, 455, 460-463) She did 
not agree that Husband should be allowed to keep all of the vested 
401K retirement plan (R. 450) 
D. Michael Nielsen, a domestic law attorney who had practiced 
11 years before the Second District commissioners and judges, 
testified that the award of alimony was wholly deficient based upon 
his experience. He testified that an appropriate range of alimony 
given the great disparities in earnings would be between $500 and 
$1,100 per month in order to more closely equalize the incomes of 
the parties and there was no basis given in the stipulation for 
Wife's conceding such a benefit. (R. 615, 617, 628-631, 635, 648, 
650, 651) 
3Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 5 reveal a chasm of difference in 
the valuation of the parties' personal property distribution, with 
Husband's valuation having Wife $14,000 ahead in value and 
Wife's valuation having Husband ahead $5,000 in value. 
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Mr. Nielsen testified that the settlement was troublesome 
because the findings of fact and decree failed to identify the 
rationale for alimony and property and debt distribution, and, 
accordingly, he could find no basis for Wife to have conceded the 
$2,745 unpaid temporary alimony and to have agreed to make the 
$7,000 payment to Husband. (R. 620, 626, 631) He could not see 
why the 4OIK plan had not been equally divided. (R. 623) He 
testified that given the great earnings disparities, Wife should 
have been entitled to an award of attorney's fees. (R. 632, 633) 
He was concerned that Wife's discovery to Husband regarding assets 
had not been answered (R. 622, 623). 
Mr. Nielsen conceded that he had not been party to settlement 
negotiations but testified: 
A. There — there should not ever be a case where 
you can't look at the findings and determine what the 
give and take was. And this is my point about this case. 
It's not possible in this case. The give and take, the 
consideration. What she gave up to take such a low 
amount certainly is not evident from any evidence. Any 
of the assets—anything about this case. (R. 648) 
Ruling 
Despite the evidence, the court found that Wife did not appear 
to be impaired at trial on April 28, 1993, that the settlement was 
fair and that the court would have made substantially the same 
award of alimony and of assets had it heard the case on the merits 
at trial. (R. 728, 735, 736) The court thereupon denied Wife's 
Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation. (R. 378-386) However, the 
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court made no specific findings regarding why the awards of 
alimony, child support and property were fair and appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION SINCE 
WIFE WAS SUFFERING FROM EXTREME ANXIETY AND WAS UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF MEDICATION 
Wife's confusion when she entered into the stipulation at 
trial was evident. Wife's response to the first four questions 
were: "I think so.", "I guess.", "I'm a little iffy on it." and 
"I'm questioning it a little bit, but I guess I'll go along with 
it." This confusion should have alerted the court that Wife was in 
no condition to enter into a stipulation. Even if, arguendo, the 
court lacked complete information of Wife's mental condition at the 
time of the hearing on April 28, 1993, it did have such information 
after the hearing to set aside the stipulation. The court abused 
its discretion in refusing to accept such information and set aside 
the stipulation. 
Property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in 
divorce proceedings and trial courts have the right and duty to 
void unconscionable stipulations. Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 
475 (Utah App. 1988); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 
1983); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184# 185 (Utah 1977). 
A stipulation is a form of contract and basic to a valid 
stipulation is the meeting of the minds of those involved. 
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Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987). A person lacks 
capacity to enter into a contract when he is unable to understand 
the nature and consequences of the transaction. Restatement of 
Contracts, Second, Section 15 (1)(a).4 Because in-court 
stipulations have not been reduced to writing and are exceptions to 
the Statute of Frauds, it is incumbent upon the trial court to 
assure that a valid mutual consent has in fact occurred. Id. at 
335. Here the court failed to assure that Wife was capable of 
knowingly and intelligently giving her consent to the stipulation. 
The evidence was uncontradicted that Wife suffered from severe 
anxiety and related confusion which was aggravated by Husband's 
change of sexual orientation and harassing behavior during the 
breakup of the marriage. The severity of Wife's anxiety condition 
was clearly manifested, not only in her behavior and personality, 
but also in her physical illness of mouth and throat ulcers so 
severe they were suspected of being cancer. (R. 477) 
Husband's harassing and coercive behavior immediately prior to 
trial aggravated Wife's condition, resulting in Wife taking a much 
higher dosage of Xanax over a 24 hour period immediately prior to 
trial than she was used to taking. 
4It has long been recognized that impaired reasoning due to 
alcohol consumption can prevent a meeting of the minds. A party 
may show, in order to defeat a settlement by him, that, at the time 
he was incapable of contracting intelligently by reason of 
intoxication, and evidence of the party's condition before or after 
the settlement is relevant to show the party's condition at the 
time the settlement was made. Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306 (Cal. 
1872) . 
17 
Expert testimony established that even small doses of Xanax 
can cause fatigue and confusion and that a sudden increase in 
consumption can dramatically impair thinking; thus# explaining 
Wife/s confused responses when asked to approve the stipulation.5 
Despite Wife's evident confusion, following the hearing to set 
aside the stipulation, the trial court erroneously entered findings 
that Wife's responses to the court were clear and concise at the 
time the stipulation was approved, that Wife appeared to be alert 
and fully understand the stipulation and that Wife appeared to act 
and respond normally and accurately to the court's questions. (R. 
382, Findings 1 and 3) 
In upholding the stipulation, the trial court also entered 
findings which were conflicting and in disregard of expert 
testimony regarding the effects of consumption of Xanax. The court 
found that Wife had failed by a preponderance of the evidence to 
prove that she had taken the amount of Xanax claimed even though 
there was no direct evidence to the contrary, even though Joyce 
Beckstrom testified that she observed Wife take Xanax, and even 
though Joyce Beckstrom testified that she personally gave Wife 
Xanax the night before trial. (R.651-661) It declined to find that 
Wife had not stockpiled drugs (R. 735), and yet found that Wife's 
supply of Xanax was fully depleted by April 28, 1993. (R. 384, 
5The stipulation was approved by Wife only after additional 
off-the-record consultation with counsel who told her, MJust go 
along with this. It's for the best of everybody concerned." (R. 
440) 
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Finding 8) . While rejecting Wife's testimony regarding the number 
of Xanax she had taken, the court found that Wife was allowed to 
take up to 8 four milligram pills per day of Xanax (R. 384, Finding 
8) and, therefore, implicitly Wife should have not been impaired 
even if she had taken as much Xanax as claimed. However, in so 
finding the court failed to consider the expert testimony that an 
increase in the amount of Xanax consumed would affect reasoning 
ability. (R. 488) 
This Court has the power in equity to substitute its own 
judgment where the trial court's assessment of the facts results in 
a manifest injustice. In re K.K.H., supra. This case does not 
merely involve the normal stress which accompanies any divorce 
trial. Wife was subjected to months of extreme psychological and 
physical stress related to her husband's change of sexual 
preference, her fear of contracting AIDS, the ensuing marital 
breakup and Husbands' coercive behavior immediately prior to trial. 
Her increased use of Xanax and its effect on her was logical and 
entitled to the serious consideration of the trial court. This 
Court must remedy this lapse of equity by setting aside the 
stipulation and allowing Wife to proceed to trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ENTER 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT JUSTIFYING ALIMONY, CHILD 
SUPPORT AND PROPERTY AWARDS 
Neither the findings of fact following trial, nor the findings 
of fact following the hearing to set aside the stipulation revealed 
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the logic which resulted in the alimony, child support and property 
awards. Presumed factors behind the stipulation were addressed 
during the hearing to set aside the stipulation, but the court 
never specifically addressed any of the factors in reaching its 
general conclusion that it would have made the same awards if the 
case had been tried. 
In Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987) the Court 
stated: 
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has 
considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and 
property interests of the parties. Argryle v. Argyle, 688 
P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984). The "determination of the 
value of the assets is a matter for the trial court which 
will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion." Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 
1982)(citations omitted). However, the trial court must 
make findings on all material issues, and its failure to 
do so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in 
the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,999 (Utah 1987). The 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of 
enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court 
took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue 
presented. Id. 
As Michael Nielsen testified: 
A. There . . . should not ever be a case 
where you can't look at the findings and determine what 
the give and take was. And this is my point about this 
case. It's not possible in this case. The give and 
take, the consideration. What she gave up to take such 
a low amount certainly is not evident from any evidence. 
Any of the assets—anything in this case. 
(R. 648) 
Therefore, the court abused its discretion in failing to enter 
specific findings justifying the terms of the settlement. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE, INEQUITABLE AWARDS OF 
ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY. 
After the stipulation Wife received less alimony and less 
child support than she had been receiving under the Courts 
temporary order. After the stipulation Wife had surrendered $2,745 
in unpaid temporary alimony and agreed to pay Husband $7,000. 
After the stipulation, Husband had merely waived claims which had 
already been judged to be without merit. The final settlement was 
unconscionable such that this Court must act in equity to correct 
a manifest injustice. State in Interest of KKH, supra. 
Alimony 
The purpose and factors involved in alimony are stated in 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985): 
This Court has described the purpose of alimony: 
"The most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." 
English v. English, 565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in 
mind, the court in English articulated three factors that must 
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide 
support. 
The award of alimony to Wife was manifestly unjust given her 
needs and the great disparity of earning power between the parties. 
At the time of trial the parties had been married over 17 years and 
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had four children, custody of which was awarded to Wife. Wife had 
worked only part-time within the home and made a few hundred 
dollars per month doing manicures. Defendant earned at least 
$4,129 per month. (R. 216, 217, 218) 
Although Husband had been ordered to pay temporary alimony of 
$400 per month (R. 52), the stipulation provided Wife would only 
receive alimony of $100 per month for the first six months, and 
$300 per month thereafter. Husband's financial declaration dated 
January 11, 1993, claimed total monthly expenses of $3,123 
including child support at the temporary order rate of $990 per 
month and alimony in the temporary amount of $400 per month. (R. 
96) His financial declaration filed on September 14, 1992, 
revealed total living expenses of $2,963. (R. 81) Wife's financial 
declaration dated September 21, 1992, showed a need of $2,986 with 
an average gross monthly income from her manicure business of 
$351.00. (R. 74, 76) The temporary order was based upon an income 
to Wife of $600 per month. (R. 580) There clearly was ample 
ability for Defendant to pay greater alimony than ordered as a 
result of the stipulation. 
Defendant contended that the reduction in the amount of 
alimony was bargained for in exchange for agreeing that alimony 
would be permanent. (R. 444, 579 ) However, the commissioner at 
the September 22, 1992, Pretrial Conference had already recommended 
that permanent alimony be awarded in a (then) 17 year marriage (R. 
72), making this concession on the part of Husband of no value. 
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Mr. Nielsen testified that a reasonable alimony award under 
the circumstances would have been a permanent award in the range of 
$550 to $1,100 per month in order to equalize the positions of the 
parties. Such an award clearly is called for when the financial 
condition and needs of Wife, Wife's ability to produce income and 
ability of Husband to support Wife are considered. Jones v. Jones, 
supra. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 
that the award of alimony was reasonable, particularly where the 
trial court offered no specific findings as to why it was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
Child Support 
Wife was awarded temporary child support in the amount of $990 
per month based upon an imputed wage of $557 for Wife and Husband's 
salary of $3,960. (R. 51, 57) Although Wife had not experienced an 
increase in earnings, the stipulation imputed earnings to her of 
$800 per month and showed Husband's earnings at $4,129 per month, 
resulting in a lesser award of child support of $944. (R. 218) 
Again, the trial court abused its discretion in not examining this 
situation and making an appropriate award supported by accurate 
findings. 
Property Distribution 
A wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share of the 
financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties' joint 
efforts during the marriage. Lee, supra. 
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Wife conceded a $7,000 payment to Husband to "equalize" the 
personal property division6, although her valuation of the personal 
property distribution put Husband ahead $5,000. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 5) Plaintiff waived her liquidated claim of back 
temporary alimony of $2,745, while Husband conceded a spurious 
claim of approximately $2,000 for non-marital funds used to 
purchase the home 17 years earlier which had been specifically 
rejected by the commissioner's pretrial recommendation.7 (R. 641) 
Wife received no attorney's fees although she had received 
such an award at the temporary hearing. She was left holding the 
entire property tax debt on the home when she found that Husband 
had raided the account which had always been used to provide the 
tax reserve. (R. 580) Although Husband's pretrial offer of 
settlement provided that Wife should receive one-half of the vested 
401K plan (R. 66)
 # the stipulation resulted in Wife waiving any 
right thereto. (R. 222) 
The stipulation resulted in Wife receiving less alimony and 
child support than she had received under the temporary order with 
no compensating increase in property settlement, and, to the 
contrary, a property settlement of less than half of the marital 
^he $7,000 payment was subject to reduction to the amount 
Wife was taxed on the shares but this resulted in no net cash 
benefit to Wife. (R.221, 222) 
7The commissioner's minute entry states, "Defendant would like 
credit for $2000 of premarital funds invested in the home. The 
court would find that after this long, the funds are co-mingled." 
(R. 72, 588) 
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assets. Accordingly, the stipulation must be set aside in order 
to remedy a manifest injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court must find that the trial court abused its 
discretion and set aside the stipulation. It must order the trial 
court to conduct a trial on all issues and enter an appropriate 
decree supported by specific findings of fact. The trial court 
should be instructed that the stipulation was not fair and given 
guidelines to assure that Wife receives sufficient awards of 
alimony and child support and a fair property settlement, including 
an order requiring that increased support awards be retroactive to 
the date of the stipulation. 
Wife should be awarded her reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in conducting this appeal and such other relief as 
may be appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £ 7 day of June, 1994. 
NEIL B. CRIST 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Title 30-3-5 Utah Code, as amended 
EXHIBIT B: Title 78-4-3 Utah Code, as amended 
30-3-5- Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meri-
torious petition for modification [Effective until 
January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
-^ r training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
-»ew orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
•hildren and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
ribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
ary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
aembers of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
he child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
he court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
ates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
s annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order 
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
EXHIBIT A 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
Every father shall support his child; and everyman shall support hxs wrfe 
when she is in need. 
T , « « J . 110 8 3:1977, ch. CrowBrferencM. - Criminal nonwipport 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 3, u m, « .
 cfaiUMn^ § 7(J.7_201 
140, 5 3; 1991, d t l f t « 1- ^ . j ^ ^ ^ t e n a n c e of parties, i 3<W-5. 
Amendment Note*. - The » » ? ™ ™
 Uni&rm Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
ment, effective April 29,1991. « * J « ? » J * AA I7M1-1 et «q. 
ther" for "man" and "every man" to "he. Act, s u-o* « - 4 
EXHIBIT B 
